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Abstract  IHC Caland designed, built and operated material, ships and com- 
plete systems for offshore oil and gas, dredging and shipping industries. The 
relatively strong economic growth in Southeast Asia offered opportunities 
for IHC Caland and other specialised suppliers. In the summer of 1998, an 
IHC Caland subsidiary contracted for an offshore project in Burma’s territo- 
rial waters. The order was for several hundreds of millions euros, hence of 
considerable interest to the company. The contract led to public stir because 
it involved work in a country controversial for its human rights situation. 
Many human rights, environmental and union organisations expressed their 
outrage and tried to move IHC Caland to cancel the contract. A controversy 
was born. It took IHC Caland long resisted the claims made by the NGOs. 
It maintained that the morality of commercial agents is limited to abiding 
with all legal laws and regulations. It therefore argued that it had not com- 
mitted any moral wrong and was allowed to do business with the Burma 
government. 
 
In the summer of 1998, an IHC Caland subsidiary contracted for an offshore 
project in Burma’s territorial waters.1  The order was for several hundreds 
of millions euros, hence of considerable interest to the company. The con- 
tract led to public stir because it involved work in a country controversial 
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1 This chapter uses the name “Burma”. The military government has since changed 
the country’s name to Myanmar, but dissidents continue to use Burma; (Myanmar) or 
Myanmar (Burma). We chose Burma for ease of reading. 
 
 
 
 
 
for its human rights situation. Many human rights, environmental and trade 
union organisations expressed their outrage and tried to move IHC Caland 
to cancel the contract. A controversy was born. At the time of the contract 
Burma seemed to have become inextricably associated with the name “IHC 
Caland”. Finally, in the summer of 2003, the Dutch Trade Union Federation 
(FNV) and the Christian Trade Union Federation (CNV) reached a com- 
promise with IHC Caland regarding its operations in Burma. Nevertheless, 
the two trade unions and other players in the controversy stressed that they 
preferred to see the company leave Burma. 
Before discussing the company’s motives and the responses to them, we 
will first present a brief description of the situation in Burma and of the 
company in question. After that we will devote a few sections to the course 
of the controversy, focussing explicitly on the various arguments presented 
by the parties to the conflict and to compromise ultimately achieved.2 
 
 
 
The Situation in Burma 
 
Burma is situated in Southeast Asia. The country borders on India, 
Bangladesh, China, Thailand and Laos. It is home to more than 52 mil- 
lion people divided over 135 different population groups. The country is 
rich in natural resources and has a long history. The Union of Burma gained 
its independence from Great Britain in 1948. The country was governed as 
a Western-style parliamentary democracy (Zarni 2000). Although after the 
Second World War Burma was considered one of the non-aligned countries 
with the best chances for development and growth, by 1987 it had become 
the UN’s “least developed country”. In the interval, General Ne Win had 
put aside the civilian government (1962) after which (1974) the country 
was transformed into a socialist, one-party state under the Burma Socialist 
Programme Party (BSPP). Ne Win sealed the country off hermetically from 
the outside world; the Burmese population was as good as forbidden to 
travel abroad and visas for foreigners were either refused or restricted to 
a brief period. Ne Win stayed in power for 26 years, partly as the result of 
 
 
2 This chapter uses newspaper articles, press releases, annual reports and other docu- 
ments to sketch developments relating to IHC Caland’s operations in Burma. In addition, 
we used conversations with Peter Ras, coordinator of Burma Centrum Nederland (BCN) 
and Jeremy Woodrum, a campaign leader in the US Campaign for Burma. We improved 
the factual accounts in the text using IHC Caland’s and BCN’s comments to earlier ver- 
sions of this chapter. To aid readability, in this chapter we did not refer to each individual 
newspaper article. A fully annotated version of this chapter can be requested from the 
authors. 
 
 
a highly centralised economic policy, military might and extreme repression 
by military intelligence and other services (Spit 1995). 
Social and political unrest grew in the spring of 1988 and culminated in 
massive strikes that summer. Protestors demanded economic and democratic 
reforms. The army crushed the rebellion by force (Ferrara 2003). After the 
summer, Ne Win withdrew and there was a partial change of government. 
The new government proclaimed martial law and adopted a new name: State 
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Summer saw the birth of 
a liberation movement, the National League for Democracy (NLD). Aung 
San Suu Kyi, daughter of one of the heroes of the struggle for independence 
against the British, returned from abroad to become leader of the NLD. 
In 1989 the military regime changed the country’s name to the Union of 
Myanmar and opened the country to foreign investment in an attempt to 
deregulate the Burmese economy and attract more foreign currency. But 
the authoritarian stranglehold on the population did not diminish (Zarni 
2000). Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and other 
organisations regularly drew attention to the military regime’s many flagrant 
and systematic human rights violations that were aimed especially against 
ethnic minorities. 
In 1990, SLORC organised free elections in which several parties par- 
ticipated. The NLD, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, who had been placed 
under house arrest well before 1989, gained 62% of the votes, good for 
more than 80% of the parliamentary seats. However, the SLORC refused 
to acknowledge the NLD’s victory. In 1991, Suu Kyi was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize for her years of non-violent struggle. She was released 
from house arrest in  1995, but  it  was  reimposed from 2000 to  2002. 
She was arrested once again in 2003 and held in secret detention for 
more than 3 months before being returned to house arrest. The house 
arrest continues today (2010), this in clear violation of international and 
Burmese law. 
 
 
 
 
Calls for a Boycott 
 
Although the events in 1988 and 1989 received relatively little attention in 
the Western media, groups of activists in Burma, Thailand and the United 
States exchanged information, maintained a political lobby and worked 
for democracy. From this grew several online list servers with news on 
Burma. The best known is BurmaNet, set up in 1994 with support from 
the Open Society Institute. The first calls for a boycott were heard in the 
early 1990s: 
 
 
By the time BurmaNet was created, there was already a small number of individ- 
uals, primarily in the United States, Thailand, and Canada, who were advocating 
consumer boycotts and were engaged in shareholder, campus and community 
activism  against  foreign  investors  with  economic  interests  in  Burma  (Zarni 
2000: 76). 
 
In September 1995, the Free Burma Coalition (FBC) was established at the 
University of Wisconsin at Madison in the USA.3  The organisation was 
established to combine, streamline and give strength to thus far uncoordi- 
nated information and protest actions. FBC used internet and other channels 
to disseminate its views widely (Danitz & Strobel 1999). Its most important 
objectives were: 
 
(1) to end foreign investment in Burma under the current military dictatorship 
through economic activism and (2) to build a genuinely grassroots international 
Free Burma movement in support of Burma’s freedom struggle (Zarni 2000: 78). 
 
Suu Kyi adopted the call for a boycott. From the mid 1990s, she regularly 
called upon foreign companies to withdraw from Burma.4 Her appeal gained 
worldwide attention. Thanks to the FBC and others a dozen multinational 
companies decided over a relatively brief period to withdraw from Burma. 
In the US, nearly 20 communities and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
adopted regulations that deterred or forbid companies from having any- 
thing to do with Burma. In May 1997, US President Clinton prohibited 
new investment in Burma. The campaign’s impact probably benefitted from 
the momentum that accompanied the release of Suu Kyi in 1995, 2 months 
before the FBC was established (Zarni 2000). 
FBC and other organisations saw investment in and trade with Burma 
as support for the military regime. Because foreign companies could only 
invest in the company through the military junta, part of the yield would 
accrue to the junta directly or indirectly through taxes. The junta could use 
these resources to strengthen its position. On IHC Caland’s contract, Burma 
Centrum Nederland (Dutch Burma Centre BCN) noted: 
 
 
 
3 There  are  similar  specialised  protest  groups  in  other  countries  (http://www. 
freeburma.org, last viewed on 20th February 2010). 
4 See   the   French   website   Info-Birmanie  (http://www.info-birmanie.org/birmanie/ 
rep.htm, last viewed on 9 December 2004) or Suu Kyi’s interview for the European 
Parliament in which she says “Now is not yet the time for investment. It is more 
important that there is the right social and political climate which will ensure the right 
structural changes that are necessary for good economic recovery and sustained devel- 
opment. Until then I think investment is too early”. (http://www.tni.org/archives/vervest/ 
burma.htm, last viewed on 9 December 2004). 
 
 
IHC Caland paid taxes to the Burmese junta through various channels, including 
local taxes, income tax for its own staff and tax on operational costs. In doing so 
the company supported the actions of the Burmese military regime.5 
 
Most protest groups chose an approach that focused on the political and 
humanitarian situation in the country. Protest groups explained companies’ 
economic activities as political acts. 
Partly in response to Aung San Suu Kyi’s call, many protest groups and 
organisations – often united in coalitions – put companies around the world 
under pressure not to invest in Burma or to halt their operations in that 
country (Shaw 2004; Spar & La Mure 2003; Vergouw & den Hond 2000). 
Persistent criticism from protest groups led a few dozen companies to decide 
to withdraw from the country. They include Heineken (June 1996), Interbrew 
(October 1996), Philips Electronics (November 1996), PepsiCo (January 
1997), Hewlett-Packard (November 1996) and Ericsson (September 1998).6 
Other companies had left Burma earlier. Among them were Levi-Strauss 
(June 1992), PetroCanada (November 1992) and Amoco (March 1994). The 
companies offered differing explanations for their actions. Some pointed 
directly or indirectly to protest threats, others spoke of a shift in priori- 
ties. Examples are: preventing reputational loss (Levi-Strauss) or pressure 
from local groups like the Chicago Coalition for a Democratic Burma and 
the Coalition for Corporate Withdrawal from Burma. Sometimes, companies 
invoked the protest groups’ arguments. Levi-Strauss, for instance, stated in 
1992 that 
 
under current circumstances, it is not possible to do business in Myanmar without 
directly supporting the military government and its pervasive violations of human 
rights.7 
 
In the Netherlands, too, the 1990s witnessed protests against new investment 
in Burma. Heineken’s decision to withdraw from the construction of a new 
brewery and to halt exports to Burma was partly due to protests and the threat 
of a consumer boycott in the Netherlands and the US (Vergouw & Den Hond 
2000). Furthermore, in 1997, the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA), the Dutch 
Socialist Party (SP), the European Parliament Green Party, and the Dutch 
trade unions FNV and CNV signed an appeal to the business community to 
 
 
5 http://www.xs4all.nl/~bcn/campagne-ihc.html, last viewed on 26 November 2004. 
6 For  a  survey  of  companies  that  have  left  Burma,  see  the  Canadian  Friends  of 
Burma (CFOB) website (http://www.cfob.org/CorpComplicity/CorpComplicity.shtml) 
and The Irrawaddy Online (vol. 12, no. 9) (http://www.irrawaddy.org/aviewer.asp?a= 
457&z=14, both last viewed on 14 December 2004). 
7 See http://perc.ca/PEN/1994-03/s-freeman.html, last viewed on 2 March 2005. 
 
 
withdraw from Burma. So, the commotion around IHC Caland’s contract did 
not fall out of the blue. Still, the company seemed surprised at the vehemence 
of the criticism, as we will see further on. This controversy lasted longer than 
the protests against Heineken’s presence in Burma. One important reason 
can be that IHC Caland could not be hard hit by a consumer boycott. It 
supplied the offshore oil and gas industry, rather than the consumer market 
(Vergouw & den Hond 2000). 
 
 
 
IHC Caland 
 
IHC Caland NV was the public holding company of a group of companies 
that “design and supply tools, ships, complete systems and services to the 
offshore oil, dredging, shipping and undersea mining industries around the 
world”.8 IHC stands for Industriële Handels Combinatie or Industrial Trade 
Combine. The company was founded on a cooperation agreement that sev- 
eral Dutch shipyards entered into in 1943. This agreement was concluded 
in the expectation that together they would be able to accept large orders 
from Billiton when the Second World War was over. The companies in the 
combine merged in 1965. The merger was first of all a financial merger, 
in which the participating companies continued to operate under their own 
names, but organisational cooperation gradually increased and more com- 
panies were added. Finally, the various subsidiaries joined together to form 
IHC Caland holding company. The company has been listed since 1965 and 
has been part of the AEX index since 2003. 
At the close of 2003, the company was good 4,100 jobs; its six sub- 
sidiaries operated in 29 countries. At that time its activities were spread over 
its offshore oil and gas operations and dredger-shipbuilding divisions. In 
its 2003 annual report, IHC Caland claimed to be worldwide market leader 
in most of its niche markets. Tables 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 show that offshore 
operations are more systematically profitable than shipbuilding. For that rea- 
son, the company announced in August 2003 that it was examining several 
options for splitting the concern. Shipbuilding operations could be sold, or 
they could be floated in a separate company. In 2004 IHC Caland split its 
shipbuilding from its dredging operations. In 2005, after the sale of its ship- 
building operations, IHC Caland continued operating under the name SBM 
N.V., already in use for its offshore division. 
 
 
8 IHC Caland. Press release, 5 August 2004 (www.ihccaland.nl/html/News/05aug04.htm, 
last viewed on 1 December 2004). 
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Nett turnover 
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566 
USD 
569 
Off-shore 387 261 311 311 550 273 312 364 1.280 
Total 692 628 648 647 1.229 828 965 930 1.849 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Dredging and n.a. 2.066 2.130 2.589 2.706 2.789 2.775 2.289 
Off-shore n.a. 779 809 890 855 1.237 1.542 1.838 
Total 2.004 2.845 2.939 3.479 3.561 4.026 4.338 4.148 
 
 
Table 7.1  Nett annual turnover, in millions 
 
 
 
 
 
Shipbuilding 
 
 
 
Source: Annual Reports IHC Caland 1993–2003 
 
 
Table 7.2  Annual profit in millions 
 
1996   1997   1998   1998   1999   2000   2001 2002 2003 
 
Profit Euro USD 
Dredging and 
Shipbuilding 
12.4 13.2 30.3 30.3 34.9 32.3 20.7   −50.0 −81.7 
Off-shore 30.9 54.7 55.1 55.0 56.2 71.8 97.6 130.0 148.8 
Total 43.3 67.9 85.4 82.7 85.7 99.7 113.8 74.8 64.4 
The contribution of the Holding are taken into account in the total profit calculations. 
The contribution of the holding company to total results is not mentioned separately in 
Table 7.2 but is included in the total result. 
Source: Annual Reports IHC Caland) 
 
 
Table 7.3  Annual total number of employees, per 31 December 
 
 
 
 
Shipbuilding 
 
 
 
The employees of the Holding are included in the totals. 
The number of employees working for the holding company is not mentioned separately 
in Table 7.3 but is included in the total number of employees. 
Source: Annual Reports IHC Caland 
 
 
The Contract 
 
On 13 July 1998, IHC Caland announced that its Swiss subsidiary SBM 
Production Contractors signed a contract with Premier Petroleum Myanmar 
Ltd., a British-Burmese joint venture that is partly owned by British Premier 
 
 
Oil. The contract was for the construction, lease and maintenance of a float- 
ing storage and off-loading system (FSO) for development of the Yetagun 
gas field, 180 km off the coast of southern Burma in the Andaman Sea. FSO 
systems are moored permanently above or near offshore oil and gas fields 
to receive and temporarily store oil and gas for transfer to tankers for trans- 
port to purchasers. High prices make oil and gas extraction in deeper waters 
profitable, so the demand for such capital-intensive systems was expected to 
increase as oil prices rise. The installation was planned to be in operation by 
the end of 1999. The immense contract was intended to run for 15 years and 
would reach several hundred million euros. In a first response to this, and 
a few other orders in Vietnam and China, Dutch financial newspaper Het 
Financieele Dagblad wrote: 
 
The Asian crisis seems to have had little impact on IHC Caland (new-build 
dredging ships and oil platforms). (Het Financieele Dagblad 1998a) 
 
Premier Oil acquired the gas field from US company Texaco because this 
company could no longer operate it after the US government forbade new 
investment in Burma in May 1997.9  Officially, Texaco withdrew after an 
asset review, but it is generally assumed that political pressure in the US 
and a desire to polish the company’s image were important factors (Knott 
1997). Other partners in the operation of the field were Malaysian Petronas, 
Japanese Nippon Oil, Thai PTT-EP and the Burmese government-owned 
company MOGE (Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprises). 
 
 
Commotion 
 
Because it involved economic activities in Burma, the contract elicited a 
storm of protest in the media. Burma Centrum Nederland (Dutch Burma 
Centre BCN), Amnesty International, XminY Solidarity Fund, Novib 
(Oxfam Netherlands), and the trade unions FNV and CNV expressed 
surprise and outrage at the delivery because it indirectly supported the mil- 
itary junta’s oppression of the Burmese people. Foreign currency from the 
Yetagun project would be an important buttress for Burma’s weak economy 
and so, claimed BCN’s spokesman, European money would be perpetuating 
the Burmese regime. 
 
The income ends up with the generals, not the population. (NRC Handelsblad 
1998a) 
 
 
9 This boycott struck several US oil companies; Spar & La Mure (2003) described the 
conflict between Unocal and the US Free Burma Coalition. See also Trouw (1998). 
 
 
Moreover, protest groups pointed out that other companies were just leav- 
ing Burma. In addition, Friends of the Earth Netherlands drew attention to 
alleged problems with the installation of the adjoining land-based infrastruc- 
ture. A pipeline, some 60 km long was being laid right through the tropical 
rain forest. The construction of the pipeline would have an adverse effect on 
biodiversity; villages would be forced to move and the construction would 
use forced labour.10 IHC Caland repeatedly stated that it dealt only with off- 
shore infrastructure and not with whatever may be taking place on land. IHC 
Caland’s CEO noted repeatedly: 
 
We are far away at sea. (Het Financieele Dagblad 1998b) 
 
BCN – one of the main Dutch players in the protest against the presence 
of IHC Caland in Burma – is a foundation whose goal is to inform Dutch 
society on developments in Burma and to instigate and coordinate activities 
that promote democracy and sustainable development in Burma. In addition, 
the centre seeks to contribute to a constructive dialogue between the various 
factions in Burma.11 
After various tarde unions, development and environmental organisations 
set up regular discussions on the situation in Burma, BCN was established 
in the early 1990s to satisfy the need for systematic action in response 
to the Burmese opposition’s call to support all activities that would bene- 
fit democracy in Burma. With financial support from Novib and the Open 
Society Institute, BCN set up and coordinated activities intended to pro- 
mote democracy and sustainable development in Burma. To achieve these 
goals, BCN zealously advocated democracy and human rights; it informed 
the public about the situation in Burma via consumer campaigns; it tried to 
exert pressure via campaigns against European companies; and it lobbied 
the European Union and the Dutch government to adopt economic sanctions 
against Burma. 
Other important players were Friends of the Earth Netherlands 
(Milieudefensie), the trade unions FNV and CNV, XminY Solidarity Fund 
and  the  Dutch  Socialist  Party  (SP).  Most  of  these  organisations were 
 
 
 
10 Friends  of  the  Earth  Netherlands,  “IHC  Caland  doet  nog  steeds  zaken  met 
Birma” (http://www.milieudefensie.nl/earthalarm/alarm77birma.htm, last viewed on 9 
December 2004). See also The Independent (2000). Similar discussions were held ear- 
lier about laying a gas pipeline for another large gas field, the Yadana field; see The 
Financial Post (1996). 
11 Burma Centrum Nederland (http://www.xs4all.nl/~bcn/, last viewed on 26 November 
2004). 
 
 
co-founders of BCN and as such aware of and involved in BCN’s activi- 
ties. But they also sought individual publicity in some campaigns. These 
organisations are BCN’s main support base. 
The storm also raged in political circles. A majority of the members 
of the House of Representatives indicated that the government should set 
guidelines that hinder companies from doing business with controversial 
regimes. The European Parliament had scheduled a debate on Burma for the 
same week that the order was announced. The leader of the Dutch Christian 
Democratic Party (CDA) stated in Brussels that “Respectable companies no 
longer invest in Burma”. (NRC Handelsblad 1998b). But just at that moment 
France vetoed a European prohibition against investment in Burma. 
Jan-Diederick Bax, then CEO at IHC Caland, said he did not understand 
the vehement commotion around the contract. He stated in Het Financieele 
Dagblad that gas extraction took place far off the Burmese coast so that the 
company had nothing to do with internal political problems. 
 
We’re not doing anything illegal. Neither the Dutch government nor the Lower 
House has forbidden investment in Myanmar. So why shouldn’t we do it? (Het 
Financieele Dagblad 1998b) 
 
At the same time, Bax said that the decision would have been different had 
it involved inland investment in Burma. He called the contract a normal 
business agreement, one floating storage site like many that IHC Caland 
operates. 
 
We have nine such installations in Brazil, Congo, Vietnam and elsewhere. As of 
next year there will be one in Myanmar. (Het Financieele Dagblad 1998b) 
 
After that, Bax invoked the fierce competition in the industry as argument. If 
he did not carry out the contract, Bax would fail to do his duty as CEO, i.e. 
to earn money for the company’s shareholders. The company repeated these 
arguments regularly. 
IHC Caland’s deal remained prominent in the news. On 17 July 1998, in 
an interview in Het Financieele Dagblad, Bax reported that Dutch banks did 
not want to finance this specific contract because they considered the polit- 
ical risk too high. Moreover, they claimed to be afraid that such financing 
could harm their interests in the US because of its 1997 prohibition against 
new investment. In the same interview, Bax said that he was overwhelmed 
by all the commotion around the order. 
 
We have to see everything in its correct proportions. What good will it do me to 
start acting proud here in Schiedam. That would have no impact at all. Someone 
else would just step in and do the project. (Het Financieele Dagblad 1998c) 
 
 
In a discussion with two PvdA Representatives and a director of FNV, Bax 
indicated several days later that he was willing to talk about the company’s 
setting up its own code of conduct. He stressed, however, that this code 
would not address the issue of with which countries IHC Caland may do 
business; as far as he was concerned the company would follow the Dutch 
government’s guidelines. (Het Financieele Dagblad 1998d) 
On 4 August 1998, the trade unions, BCN, XminY Solidarity Fund and 
Novib met with IHC Caland’s management. The discussion proved fruitless. 
BCN wanted the order cancelled but that was out of the question for IHC 
Caland. 
 
They repeated their position, we ours, 
 
according to Bax, who had already spoken with PvdA MPs and was 
scheduled to meet with Amnesty International. 
 
No one may have a say about whether we accept or reject an order, but we are 
willing to discuss a code of conduct on human rights. We do not infringe these. 
(NRC Handelsblad 1998c) 
 
After these meetings, BCN, speaking for itself and XminY, announced in 
an op-ed article in the 8 August issue of Het Financieele Dagblad that a 
range of actions would be undertaken. The groups wanted to approach IHC 
Caland’s employees via the unions as well as contacting the board of direc- 
tors, the council of supervisors and the larger shareholders. In addition, the 
groups planned to purchase one share in IHC Caland to obtain a right to 
address the shareholders’ meeting. They also made preparations for pub- 
lic protests. Later that month, the Dutch government announced in a letter 
responding to various questions from MPs that it would investigate possi- 
ble economic sanctions against Burma. Such sanctions would have to be 
imposed as part of a broader European campaign. 
When IHC Caland announced its mid-year figures on 24 August 1998, 
BCN held a protest action at the entrance to IHC Caland’s headquarters 
in Schiedam. Three bloodied “victims” of the regime in Burma lay there. 
Because this protest action had been announced in advance, the meeting 
drew much media attention. During the meeting, Bax stressed that he was 
unable and unwilling to withdraw from a contract that had already been 
signed, even when the Dutch government should announce a boycott. 
 
If we break this contract, we will get a bad reputation. We do not do such things. 
(Het Parool 1998) 
 
During the same meeting, Bax said he received no comment on the contract 
from the company: 
 
 
I didn’t hear a word of concern from a single employee, shareholder or supervisor. 
They understand how we work (Het Parool 1998) 
 
At the same time, Bax also stated that the situation would be different if IHC 
Caland’s operations were to require dealing with the public. 
 
Like  Heineken, then  matters  would  be  different. But  we  work  business-to- 
business. And in our network it’s just not an issue. (Het Financieele Dagblad 
1998e) 
 
A month later, the Dutch government indicated in response to MPs questions 
that it disapproved of IHC Caland’s investment in Burma but that there were 
no juridical grounds for taking steps against individual companies at that 
time. 
At that point the controversy disappeared from the media, although “the 
IHC-Burma question” was cited regularly in relation to investment. On 7 
October 1998, for instance, the company had a meeting with the Dutch 
Association of Investors for Sustainable Development (VBDO) on the risks 
to investors of investing in Burma. Other publications on sustainable invest- 
ment and discussions on corporate social responsibility generally often 
referred to IHC Caland’s disputed contract in Burma. 
 
 
 
Toward a Code of Conduct 
 
In April 1999, Bax announced that IHC Caland was working on a code of 
conduct but that it would probably not be presented at the next sharehold- 
ers’ meeting. Drafting a code is labour intensive, Bax noted. ABP pension 
fund, owner of a few percent of the share capital demanded that the company 
draft such a code. The Dutch ABN-AMRO Fund also let it be known that it 
was not happy with the contract in Burma. Nevertheless, Bax stressed that 
none of the major shareholders disinvested in the company after it accepted 
the order from Burma. Just before the annual meeting, it was announced 
that IHC Caland would, indeed, not be presenting a code of conduct on 
human rights. CEO Bax said that he preferred to wait for draft texts from 
the EU or the Ministry of Economic Affairs. During the shareholders’ meet- 
ing, ABP appeared willing to give the company more time. Bax resigned as 
CEO during this annual meeting. Aad de Ruyter took his place. 
Chairman of the supervisory board Langman announced on behalf of IHC 
Caland that the company would present a code of conduct that same year. 
However, Langman added that the company did not intend to act differently 
in similar circumstances unless it would risk government sanctions: 
 
 
If we should again find ourselves in such a situation, we would again accept the 
order. We work in many countries that infringe human rights. We do not think that 
we should act more circumspect when the government does not forbid investment 
in these countries. (Het Financieele Dagblad 1999) 
 
After the meeting, an ABP director said he was satisfied with the promise: 
 
We prefer that they take their time for this difficult task than that they make hasty 
decisions. (De Telegraaf 1999) 
 
However, a policy officer at FNV wrote in June 1999: 
 
IHC Caland is using its willingness to develop a code to stave off discussion on 
investing in Burma and on being an accessory to serious human rights violations 
(van Wezel 1999: 58). 
 
Directly related to ABP’s concern, CNV chairman Terpstra referred a few 
months later to pension funds’ social responsibility; he presented an invest- 
ment code for pension fund managers containing guidelines for how pension 
funds should handle their social responsibility. This code is based in part on 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) guidelines. The two trade unions 
have seats on the boards of many pension funds, including ABP. 
 
 
 
A Second Contract and a Code 
 
By the end of 1999, IHC Caland was again in discredit when it became 
known that the company had accepted a second order from Burma. Although 
this was a much smaller order – for delivery of a dredging ship – again 
commotion arose. In response to parliamentary questions to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, the new CEO De Ruyter said that the board of IHC Caland 
had never spent as much time discussing any other order as it did this one. 
However, there were no international rules; for that reason IHC Caland again 
requested a clear governmental guideline. BCN also rejected this order, since 
the ship would be purchased directly by the military regime which could then 
improve the country’s infrastructure. IHC Caland objected that a dredging 
ship could not be used to infringe human rights. At the same time, De Ruyter 
said that the promised code of conduct was nearly finished. 
On a political level discussions were held on the desirability of a code of 
conduct. The employers association VNO-NCW opposed a national scheme 
because international discussions on responsible business conduct were then 
ongoing in the EU; they were intended to culminate in agreements. At 
the same time the labour party (PvdA) worked on a private member’s bill 
that would have companies demonstrate accountability and responsibility in 
 
 
their annual reports. All these discussions regularly refer to IHC Caland’s 
controversial contract in Burma. 
In May 2000, right before IHC Caland’s annual meeting, ABN-AMRO, 
one of the largest Dutch banks, announced that it had closed the office that 
it had maintained in Burma since 1995 and sold its shares in IHC Caland. 
Although the bank denied that this was intended to express a moral judg- 
ment, it did refer in a letter to BCN to IHC Caland’s investment in Burma. 
In the same period, Gerrit Ybema (of D66, a liberal Dutch political party), 
then state secretary for economic affairs, said that he wanted to discour- 
age irresponsible social conduct on the part of the business community by 
withholding export and investment grants. 
IHC Caland’s code of conduct was officially presented at a shareholders’ 
meeting held on 26 May 2000. Responses were mixed. The ABP pension 
fund pointed out that the code did not repair the reputational damage asso- 
ciated with investment in Burma. The pension fund wanted to reassess its 
ownership of IHC Caland shares. A few months later, the FNV trade union 
demanded in a policy document that pension funds would engage in socially 
responsible investment. In this regard, the trade union also raised the issue 
of ABP’s investment in IHC Caland. In March 2001 it became known that 
ABP did, indeed, sell its participation in IHC Caland in 2000 because of 
the company’s investments in Burma; toward the end of 2001 a group of 
large European pension funds warned companies operating in Burma that 
they should carefully weigh the risks of such activities. Dutch pension fund 
PGGM was one of that warning letter’s signatories. Together, the signato- 
ries represented a large percentage of the capital, which added weight to 
their warning. 
 
 
 
Escalation and “a Different Tone” 
 
De Ruyter resigned as CEO at the shareholders’ meeting held 26 May 
2000; it is rumoured that this was due to a difference of opinion on the 
company’s strategic direction. Sjef van Dooremalen succeeded him. When 
Van Dooremalen, in his turn, left in August 2004, Het Financieele Dagblad 
reported that he had played an important role in discussions on IHC Caland’s 
activities in Burma; this was not so much the result of a new direction for 
the company, but 
 
because he adopted a different tone from his predecessors, Van Dooremalen was 
able to blunt the edge of the conflict. (Het Financieele Dagblad 2004a) 
 
However, an escalation had preceded this “different tone”. 
 
 
In June 2000, ministers of OECD member countries agreed on a revi- 
sion  of  the  Guidelines for  Multinational Enterprises. These guidelines 
are a collection of voluntary rules of behaviour for multinational com- 
panies. OECD member states drafted a first version in 1976 as part of 
the OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises. The guidelines contain recommendations relat- 
ing to labour relations, consumer protection and combating bribery, but also 
on human rights and environmental protection. The Dutch government rec- 
ommended the OECD guidelines to the business community and planned to 
use these guidelines as criteria in allocating grants. Responses were mixed. 
Employer’s organisation VNO-NCW is not at all interested in national 
agreements because in their view only international agreements could guar- 
antee that Dutch companies would be able to compete on a level playing 
field, while various NGOs preferred to see the guidelines made universally 
binding on the entire business community. According to van Luijk (2000), 
however, the new OECD guidelines were a major step forward toward doing 
international business responsibly. One element in the OECD agreement is 
the chance to submit a complaint to a national contact point (NCP). There are 
no sanctions attached to this complaints procedure beyond the publication of 
whatever contraventions may occur, although unions and other stakeholders 
hope that an NCP decision will provide grounds for legal action. At the end 
of 2001, FNV and CNV trade unions announced that they had submitted 
a complaint to the NCP that summer against IHC Caland on the grounds 
that the company contributed to the prolongation of the military regime in 
Burma. The complaints procedure would be rounded off in the summer of 
2004. 
2002 was a turbulent year in the controversy; pressure on IHC Caland 
increased. In early 2002, another large company left Burma partly as a result 
of actions by BCN, Novib, the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) and trade 
union FNV. Triumph, a large Swiss lingerie producer left Burma 
 
because of the public discussion in Europe. (NRC Handelsblad 2002) 
 
In a new series of actions, BCN called upon 89 Dutch provinces, munic- 
ipalities and companies not to award contracts for dredging ports to IHC 
Caland, stressing that IHC Caland is one of the last Dutch companies still 
involved in economic activities in Burma. In April 2002, Friends of the Earth 
Netherlands sprayed IHC Caland’s headquarters with 6,000 l of (ecological) 
dredged mud to draw attention to 
 
the filthy business that this company does. (Rotterdams Dagblad 2002) 
 
 
Van Dooremalen responded in an interview with the Dutch daily De 
Telegraaf at the end of March 2002. In the interview, he said that the mili- 
tary regime in Burma was no good, but that it was a governmental duty to 
demand accountability for this, especially on the part of the EU. He repeated 
the position that IHC Caland had long held. Still, IHC Caland slowly started 
to change its attitude. When it published its annual figures a few days later, 
Van Dooremalen announced that the company would accept no new orders 
in Burma, although it would not break its current contracts. Van Dooremalen 
said that this decision was reached at the urgent request of then state sec- 
retary of Economic Affairs, Gerrit Ybema (D66 party). BCN spoke of an 
empty gesture because the current contracts would be served out. In a later 
letter in Het Financieele Dagblad BCN’s coordinator pointed out that the 
state secretary had not caused this “modest ‘shift in the right direction’ but 
that increasing social pressure had”. (Het Financieele Dagblad 2002). 
Despite this change of direction, the protests did not stop. For instance, 
Friends  of  the  Earth  Netherlands  presented  the  results  of  a  study  on 
IHC Caland’s financial flows; it showed that over the previous years, five 
Dutch financial institutions had supported IHC Caland with large long-term 
loans.12 The presence of one of these institutions, NIB Capital, was striking 
because NIB is owned by ABP and PGGM pension funds that had earlier 
spoken critically about IHC Caland.13 In May 2002, BCN responded to the 
report by Friends of the Earth by calling on these banks to stop extending 
loans to IHC Caland; in June 2002 BCN campaigned during IHC Caland’s 
annual meeting to draw attention to Burma’s being the world’s largest opium 
producer and to the Burmese government’s involvement in drugs trade via 
whitewashing drugs money through state-owed companies. The message to 
shareholders was: 
 
IHC Caland not only helps keep the military regime in power, it also helps the 
Burmese junta whitewash drugs money (BCN undated) 
 
In September 2002, British oil company Premier Oil announced it would 
leave Burma and transfer its holdings there to Malaysian Petronas. Premier 
 
 
 
12 The banks in question are ABN-AMRO, ING, Fortis, Rabobank and NIB Capital. 
See also Friends of the Earth Netherlands, “Bagger Rapport Birma” (http://www. 
milieudefensie.nl/globalisering/publicaties/Bagger_Rapport_Birma_deel_voor 
_website.pdf, last viewed on 26 November 2004). 
13 An ABP spokesman responded with surprise, but as a shareholder he was unfamiliar 
with the loan from NIB Capital. The subject would be treated in ABP’s next meeting 
with NIB Capital. (Algemeen Dagblad 2002) 
 
 
Oil stated that it was a purely commercial decision, but British and inter- 
national pressure groups certainly saw the departure as the result of their 
campaigns. Dutch pressure groups also saw Premier Oil’s departure as a 
good occasion for IHC Caland to withdraw from Burma; after all, its con- 
tracting partner had now left. IHC Caland’s Van Dooremalen announced that 
there was little reason for the company to change its stance toward Burma. A 
contract is a contract and breaking a contract would be expensive and could 
damage the company’s reputation. 
On 11 December 2002, BCN and Friends of the Earth Netherlands issued 
the following press release: 
 
many civil society organisations and most of the Dutch House of Representatives 
urgently request five banks to halt their support for offshore company IHC 
Caland.14 
 
The call received support from a broad range of organisations and several 
companies, varying from BCN and Friends of the Earth Netherlands to Pax 
Christi, XminY Solidarity Fund and several political parties.15 In addition, 
the ASN Bank, which took a different stand from the rest of the Dutch 
banking community also signed the call. In February 2003, the five banks 
to whom the call was addressed agreed not to finance any more of IHC 
Caland’s Burmese projects. However, the banks did not comply with the 
call’s request to put pressure on IHC Caland to terminate its contract in 
Burma. ABN-AMRO wrote that it does not normally provide information 
on its contacts with customers, but that it would make an exception in this 
case, given the gravity of the situation. In a detailed explanation, the bank 
noted that it respected IHC Caland’s decision to serve out its contract, but 
it would not finance any contracts in Burma. Van Dooremalen responded 
by saying that ICH Caland’s Burmese operations were financed by Japanese 
 
 
14 BCN and Friends of the Earth Netherlands press release, 11 December 2002. Civil 
society organisations and parliamentary parties asked the banks to cut off financial sup- 
port for IHC Caland (http://www.milieudefensie.nl/persber/globalisering/021211.htm, 
last viewed on 26 November 2004). 
15 BCN, Vereniging Milieudefensie, Novib, de Stichting Interkerkelijke Organisatie 
voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (ICCO), Humanistisch Overleg Mensenrechten 
(HOM),  Both  Ends,  the  International  Union  for  Conservation  of  Nature  and 
Natural  Resources  (IUCN),  Greenpeace,  Justitia  et  Pax,  Multatuli  Travel,  Body 
Shop, Pax Christi, Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (IKV), Transnational Institute (TNI), 
Stichting  Onderzoek  Multinationale  Ondernemingen  (SOMO),  XminY  Solidarity 
Fund, Evert Vermeer Stichting, several parliamentary parties (CDA, VVD, PvdA, 
GroenLinks, D66, SP and ChristenUnie) and ASN Bank all signed the appeal 
(http://www.milieudefensie.nl/persber/globalisering/021211.htm, last  viewed  on  26 
November 2004). 
 
 
banks but, given that the company had already decided not to accept any new 
orders from Burma, he thought the banks’ announcement superfluous. 
Campaigns continued in early 2003. In January 2003, the Socialist Party 
(SP) organised an action around an informal meeting of IHC Caland share- 
holders at Sliedrecht shipyard. Because SP and BCN each held one share of 
IHC Caland, two protesters also had access to the meeting where they posed 
critical questions. BCN and Friends of the Earth Netherlands again protested 
during the presentations of IHC Caland’s figures and at its meetings. Once 
again an appeal was launched to IHC Caland’s principal bankers to have 
them demand that IHC Caland terminate its operations in Burma. Speaking 
for the company, Van Dooremalen repeated that the company would not 
accept any new assignments in Burma but that it would serve out its cur- 
rent contracts and in doing so would follow OECD guidelines. A few weeks 
later, Van Dooremalen announced that this new stance toward Burma had 
cost the company a six-million-euro contract for the construction of three 
dredging ships. The order went to a Chinese company. 
 
 
Toward a Solution? 
 
In the summer of 2003, IHC Caland announced that it wanted to address 
the human rights situation in Burma by speaking regularly to the Burmese 
ambassador in London (there is no Burmese embassy in the Netherlands). 
Calling the ambassador to account is a conscious act, flowing from a desire 
to comply with OECD guidelines and from talks with Dutch trade unions, 
BCN and Friends of the Earth Netherlands. In talks with the ambassador 
held on 11 June 2003, the management of IHC Caland and a representative 
of the trade union expressed their concern about the human rights viola- 
tions in Burma, especially forced labour, and requested that their concern 
be passed on to the Burmese government. In the same press release, IHC 
Caland announced that it would ask the Malaysian oil company Petronas, 
which had become the new principal after Premier Oil’s departure, to comply 
with OECD guidelines when working in Burma. 
A year later, in July 2004, the trade unions’ complaint, lodged in 2001 
with the National Contact Point for Corporate Social Responsibility, was 
formally completed. FNV and CNV trade unions and IHC Caland reached a 
compromise on the company’s economic involvement in Burma. The trade 
unions would check in a year’s time whether the company’s operations in 
Burma complied sufficiently with the OECD guidelines. Although the trade 
unions still thought that IHC Caland should withdraw from Burma, a policy 
staffer at FNV said that the union 
 
 
had to moderate its demands because the OECD guidelines did not offer sufficient 
grounds for it to demand that the company leave. (Rotterdams Dagblad 2004) 
 
Referring to the NCP’s hearing of the complaint, NGO representatives nev- 
ertheless wondered how effective OECD guidelines were, when there was 
no control over Dutch multinationals’ compliance with these guidelines. 
Moreover, they point out that the OECD guidelines applied only to invest- 
ments and not to trade relations and that, in addition, the guidelines were not 
enforceable. For these reasons they argued for making them less voluntary 
(Het Financieele Dagblad 2004b).16 
 
 
 
Epilogue: Dialogue or Sanctions? 
 
Meanwhile, the situation in Burma remains controversial and the call for 
pressure and sanctions continues. In May 2002, Suu Kyi was released from 
house arrest. On that occasion she stated that the NLD still opposed foreign 
investments, aid and tourism to Myanmar as long as the military held power; 
she said she hoped that dialogue with the regime on national reconciliation 
could now resume. In the spring of 2003, the military regime again tightened 
its control over Burma; in May 2003 Suu Kyi was again placed under house 
arrest. 
After this deterioration in the situation in Burma, the Bush government 
decided at the end of August 2003 to impose additional economic sanctions, 
in part as response to the expanded lobbying by the US Campaign for Burma 
(USCB) and with agreement of the government in exile. The “Burmese 
Freedom and Democracy Act” prohibits imports from Burma, freezes the 
assets of the Burmese government in the US, denies entry to the US to SPDC 
(the State Peace and Development Council, SLORC’s successor) members 
and offers general support to those working for freedom, democracy and 
peace in Burma. Congress must reconfirm the act annually. In September 
2004, the European Parliament also adopted proposals for heavier sanctions 
against Burma because the country did not do enough to respect human 
rights. This measure ensured that European companies could no longer do 
business with Burmese state-owned companies. One important condition to 
which companies and political leaders regularly referred seems to have been 
 
 
 
16 This is an op-ed article written by a staff-member at the Centre for Research on 
Multinational Corporations (SOMO) and a staff member at Irene, an international 
organisation monitoring the strategies of international companies and employees’ rights. 
 
 
met. Shortly after the European decision in November 2004, the Dutch par- 
liament adopted a motion calling for sanctions and political pressure. That 
motion called on the government to work for further EU measures such as 
prohibiting investment, prohibiting the import of teak wood, and to try to 
have the human rights situation in Burma placed on the agenda of the UN 
Security Council. 
It is hardly possible to predict what turn campaigns against Western com- 
panies operating in Burma will take. Arguments presented in this discussion 
concentrate on weighing economy and market regulation against argu- 
ments of political morality (fostering democracy, respecting human rights). 
Sometimes other voices can be heard; the advantages and disadvantages of 
boycotts and investment in Burma have been discussed in other publications 
(e.g. White 2004) and newspaper articles (Financial Times 2004a).17 Since 
the summer of 2003, the US Free Burma Coalition (FBC) seems to have cho- 
sen for a radically different course. In articles on its website, the organisation 
notes that it is no longer convinced that Western sanctions and isolating 
Burma are an effective way to stimulate democracy. FBC now argues for 
greater cooperation and openness. The background of the publications on 
the FBC website is not known. Jeremy Woodrum, current USCB campaign 
leader and former FBC staff member, explained in a telephone conversation 
on 4 February 2005 that the FBC imploded in 2003 after an internal conflict; 
all but one of the staff members left FBC and set up the USCB in September 
2003 to continue their activities. Since then, FBC has fallen still. Woodrum 
notes that since that time the Burma movement no longer takes the FBC 
seriously. 
In response to the question what BCN thought of the FBC’s changed 
position, the BCN answered that the legitimacy of their pro-sanction posi- 
tion would dissolve were the Burmese population to turn unanimously 
against sanctions, but there are no indications that this will happen. BCN 
has had insufficient contact with FBC to be able to explain its appar- 
ent change of course, but it also says that there are still many Burma 
groups that do support the pro-sanction position,18 among these are the 
USCB as is apparent from its leaders’ letters to newspapers (Financial 
Times 2004b). The government in exile also continues to favour sanctions. 
Protests against companies operating in Burma seem not to have been sus- 
pended yet. In addition, at the end of 2004, there was a power struggle 
 
 
 
17 Similar discussions about the announcement of US sanctions took place in Dutch 
media in the summer of 2003. 
18 BCN oral communication from coordinator P. Ras (12 January 2005). 
 
 
within the Burmese regime which resulted in a stronger position for the 
hardliners. The situation in Burma remains controversial and Western com- 
panies operating in that country continue to run the risk of being called to 
account. 
All things considered, the Dutch parties grew closer together in 2003. IHC 
Caland visited the Burmese ambassador in London to discuss the human 
rights situation in Burma while BCN and Friends of the Earth Netherlands 
suspended their campaigns in anticipation of IHC Caland’s next steps. The 
trade unions FNV and CNV will check whether the company’s operations 
in Burma comply sufficiently with the OECD guidelines. As far as Dutch 
protest groups are concerned, whether IHC Caland’s compromise has really 
warded off all commotion on its presence in Burma will depend on whether 
the company rides out its current course and continues to call the Burmese 
government and its business partners in the Yetagun project to order for their 
part in the human rights situation. 
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